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 1 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE WRONG KIND OF REASONS  
ULRIKE HEUER 
UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS 
 
 ?>ĞƚƵƐǁĞŝŐŚƚŚĞŐĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞůŽƐƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶǁĂŐĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ'ŽĚ 
exists. Let us estimate these two probabilities; if you win, you win all; if you 
lose, you lose nothing. Wager then, without hesitaƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ,ĞĚŽĞƐĞǆŝƐƚ ? ? ?Blaise 
Pascal, Pensées)  
 
dŚĂƚǇŽƵǁŝŶĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŵƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚŬŝŶĚŽĨ reason for believing that God exists, 
even if Pascal is right that you stand to lose nothing, but you may gain a lot.
1
 It 
seems to be a reason of the wrong kind. There is currently a wide-ranging 
philosophical discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes such as belief, which 
are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons for those attitudes. The 
question is what the distinction shows about the nature of the attitudes, and about 
reasons and normativity in general. The distinction is deemed to apply to reasons for 
different kinds of attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as so-called pro-
attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire.  
 
tůŽĚĞŬZĂďŝŶŽǁŝĐǌ ?ƐĂŶĚdŽŶŝZønnow-ZĂƐŵƵƐƐĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌ “dŚĞ^ƚƌŝŬĞŽĨƚŚĞĞŵŽŶ ?
(2004) forged the shape and structure of the current discussion. Their focus is on the 
fitting-attitude theory of value (henceforth: FA theory), a version of which is (as they 
see it) the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ďƵĐŬ-passing account ?2, the view that the value of an object 
consists in the fact that it has properties other than that of being valuable which 
provide reasons for pro-attitudes. The main problem for this approach is that there 
are some reasons for having those attitudes which are not provided by properties 
that make their object valuable. Those are the wrong kind of reasons in the sense 
that FA theory must be able to distinguish them from those properties that figure in 
the analysis of value. 
But the discussion of the wrong kind of reasons problem (for short: WKR problem) 
has spread far beyond FA theory and buck-passing accounts: various philosophers
3
 
hope to provide a unified account of central issues concerning practical and 
theoretical normativity by giving an explanation of why certain reasons are of the 
wrong kind for forming an attitude.  
They perceive what appears to be a unified phenomenon, and suspect that the 
explanation of why some reasons are of the wrong kind and others of the right kind 
for having an attitude are relevantly similar across different attitudes, and may 
                                                      
1
 Note, however, that Pascal does not enjoin us to believe, but to wager that God exists.  
2
 Scanlon (1998); for a critical discussions of the buck-passing account, see Heuer (2006 and 2011) and 
Väyrynen (2006). 
3
 E.g. Hieronymi (2005), Shah (2008), McHugh (2012), Way (2012), Schroeder (2012). 
 2 
reveal constitutive normative constraints
4
 that the attitudes in question are subject 
to. If the explanation of the right kind/wrong kind of reasons distinction is basically 
the same, or has the same general form, for theoretical attitudes such as belief, and 
practical attitudes like intention, and both rely on the normative constraints that are 
constitutive for the attitudes, then we may be able to provide a unified account of 
theoretical and practical normativity. Thus, explaining why certain reasons are of the 
wrong kind would furnish a heuristic for discovering important features of practical 
and theoretical normativity alike. 
In this paper I want to show why this ambition is misguided. I will argue for two 
claims: (1) we should sharply distinguish the wrong kind of reasons problem as it 
arises for FA theories from any other problem that comes under the same name, and 
 ? ? ?ƚŚĞt<ZƉƌŽďůĞŵŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨ&ƚŚĞŽƌǇĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌƐŚĂƉĞ ?ŝĨ indeed 
there is such a problem at all). In particular, there is no similarity between reasons to 
believe and reasons to intend in this regard, and therefore no hope for a unified 
explanation of the alleged phenomenon. 
1. The WKR problem in FA theory 
FA theory which led to formulating the WKR problem is concerned with reducing the 
evaluative to the deontic. That something is of value means (semantic reduction) or 
consists in (metaphysical reduction) the fact that it is fitting to have certain attitudes 
towards it. When are attitudes of the relevant kind (roughly, pro-attitudes) fitting or 
appropriate? If the answer were that they are appropriate when their object is of 
value, the reduction would have failed. If having value reduces to the fittingness of 
those attitudes, then what makes the attitudes fitting cannot be that the object has 
value: the fitting attitude cannot explain itself.  
The so-called buck-passing account of value avoids this circle: According to it, that an 
object has value consists in its having other properties that make certain attitudes 
towards the object appropriate (or: that provide reasons for having those attitudes). 
Being of value reduces to having those other properties that make the attitude 
fitting. Understood in this way, the buck-passing account is an improved version of 
FA theory.
5
 
The WKR problem then arises because, intuitively, there are reasons for attitudes 
that are unrelated to the value of their objects. Evil-demon examples have been 
used to illustrate the point: that an evil demon threatens to punish you if you don't 
admire a worthless object may be a reason for admiring it, but not a reason that is 
provided by a property that makes the object valuable. 
                                                      
4
 Or alternatively, the explanation may be teleological appealing to ƚŚĞ ‘Ăŝŵ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂttitude (cf. 
McHugh 2011, 2012; for a critical discussion see Owens 2003). 
5
 McHugh and Way (forthcoming) show that the move by which the buck-passer avoids the circle is 
available to FA theorists as well, even if they do not endorse buck-passing. They suggest that we 
should distinguish between two claims: (1) that value consists in have other properties that make 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĂŬŝŶŐĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐ the same as providing reasons. McHugh and 
Way argue that the FA theorist should accept the first claim (thereby avoiding the circle) but not the 
second. Buck-passing views endorse both. 
 3 
Unless the FA theorist can identify the right kind of reasons for having the relevant 
attitudes, the analysis ĨĂŝůƐ PŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨǀĂůƵĞ ? The wrong kind of 
reasons problem is the problem that there seem to be counterexamples to the 
proposed analysis of value. They prove it wrong  W unless it is possible to distinguish 
between the right and the wrong kind of reasons, and to reformulate the account in 
terms of the right reasons. 
FA theory needs to explain which reasons are the right ones while avoiding 
circularity. The answer should not be that the right kind of reasons for an attitude 
are those that are provided by the properties that make their object valuable.  The 
explanation to be avoided looks somewhat like this: 
 [Value] The value of an object, O, consists in the fact that O has other 
properties that provide the right kind of reasons for certain favorable 
attitudes towards O. 
[RK Reasons] Reasons of the right kind are those that are provided by those 
properties that make O valuable. 
The buck-passing account avoids the simpler circle of explaining the right kind of 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛvalue by emphasizing that the reasons are provides 
by properties other than that of ďĞŝŶŐǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚĞůƉǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŽŶĞ ?6  
This is the WKR problem for FA theory. Proponents of FA theory have provided 
ingenious answers to the circularity worry.
7
 My concern here is not with the 
possibility of solving this problem, but with distinguishing it from a different problem 
with which it is sometimes conflated. There is a wider use of the right/wrong kind of 
reasons terminology which has gained currency independently of FA theory. It is 
used to draw a distinction between reasons for attitudes in general. (Some even 
think that there is such a distinction with regard to all reasons, including reasons for 
action.
8
)  
>Ğƚ ?ƐĐĂůůƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚŬŝŶĚŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞof FA 
theory Reasons Theorists. Their hope is to provide a unified account of theoretical 
and practical normativity by focusing on the WK/RK reasons distinction as a shared 
feature in particular of reasons to believe and reasons to intend. 
                                                      
6
 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006) explore the possibility of embracing the circle. While 
circular explanations can be helpful, this particular circle seems explanatorily void to me. The only 
thing we learn from it is that values provide reasons. But that claim can be couched in a much less 
problematic form PŝƚŶĞĞĚŶ ?t be put as a metaphysical reduction. And it is this, ambitious, feature of 
the account that creates the problems. 
7
 Cf. Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004, 2006), Olson (2004), Lang (2008), Way (2012). 
8
 Schroeder (2010). There is indeed such a distinction within FA theory: there may be actions which 
could count as pro-responses to valuable objects in the relevant sense. E.g., there may be a reason for 
a pro-response towards an object, such as protecting it, because the object has final value. If so, there 
can be reasons of the wrong kind for this response ? ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ ?, i.e. reasons that are not provided by 
those properties that make the object valuable. I am grateful to Wlodek Rabinowicz for alerting me to 
this possibility. I will come back to it in section 2, fn 19. But, pace Schroeder (2010), there are no 
wrong kind reasons for actions beyond FA theory (Heuer 2011).  
 4 
Specifying the two claims I will argue for in the light of this distinction, they are, first, 
that the Resasons Theorist must mean something different from what FA theorists 
ŵĞĂŶďǇ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ?ǁƌŽŶŐŬŝŶĚŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ? (section 2), and secondly, that there is no 
WKR problem, remotely like the one in FA theory, which arises for reasons for 
attitudes in general. In particular, it is not a unifying feature of reasons for attitudes 
in general that we can draw a wrong/right kind of reasons distinction. Whilst reasons 
to believe may appear to support the Reasons TŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽŝŶƚĞŶĚĚŽ
not: there cannot be a unifying account of practical and theoretical normativity 
along these lines. (Section 3) 
2. Cutting loose: The alleged WKR problem beyond FA theory 
While it is quite clear what is meant by the right/wrong kind of reasons in FA theory, 
it is pretty unclear beyond. In FA theory the wrong kind of reasons are simply 
putative counterexamples to the theory. But what do those who hope to use the 
right/wrong kind of reasons distinction beyond FA theory mean by it? 
A core example where the right/wrong kind of reasons distinction is deemed to have 
application  W outside FA theory  W is belief. Traditionally, FA theory does not make 
reference to belief, since it is not a pro-attitude.
9
 But might there nonetheless be a 
similar distinction of right/wrong kind reasons for belief? After all, with regard to 
beliefs we can distinguish between reasons to believe that p because there is 
evidence for p, and reasons to believe that p, because having the belief would be 
good or beneficial in some way (e.g. PascĂů ?ƐǁĂŐĞƌ ?ŽƌĂƌĞĂƐŽŶ for believing p 
because it would make one happy if p). Evidence for the truth of p is a kind of reason 
for believing p that we can follow, and perhaps even follow automatically, when 
considering whether p. In this regard it contrasts with other kinds of reasons for 
having beliefs. That it would make me happy to believe that the EU referendum (in 
the UK) was in favour of remaining may be a reason for having that belief, but I 
cannot form it for that reason. It would also not be rational to form the belief for 
that reason, ĂŶĚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƌationality to not respond to this reason 
at all. Furthermore, one cannot reason to the belief that p (or that not-p) via the 
reason that believing p (or: not-p) causes happiness or anxiety. So those are 
(perhaps) reasons of the wrong kind for believing p.  
Are they tracing the same distinction that the FA theorist needs to draw with regard 
to attitudes such as admiration, desire, or preference? At first blush, the similarity 
seems striking. After all, as with wrong kind reasons in FA theory, the reason is 
provided by the value of having the attitude and in both cases, ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶ ?ƚ
possible to form the attitude for this kind of reason  W at least not directly. E.g. it is 
not possible to admire a worthless object because, unless you do, an evil demon will 
torture you. Having the attitude would be good in this case, but you cannot form it 
for that reason  W at least not directly. 
                                                      
9
 But see McHugh (2014). 
 5 
Mark Schroeder
10
 ŚĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚĂƐĞƚŽĨĨŽƵƌ “ĞĂƌŵĂƌŬƐ ?ƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƚŚĞ
characteristic features of the right/wrong kind of reasons distinction generally (i.e. 
within FA theory and beyond). Formulated with regard to belief, the earmarks are: 
1.  ?ƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇŽĨŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? P “ŝƚŝƐĞĂƐŝĞƌ ?ƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚp on the basis of 
evidence for the truth of p than to believe that p as, say, the result of wishful 
thinking. 
2. The wrong kind of reasons are reasons that do not contribute to the 
rationality of believing p. 
3. dŚĞǇĂůƐŽĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞĂƌŽŶƚŚĞcorrectness of believing p. 
4. They have a distinctive  ?ĨůĂǀŽƵƌ ?. 
tĞƐŚŽƵůĚďƌĂĐŬĞƚ ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ‘ŽƌƌĞĐƚŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶ ? ? ?ĂƉƉĞĂůƐƚŽƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚĂďĞůŝĞĨŝƐ
deemed correct if it is true. But if so, there can be any number of reasons of the right 
kind that do not bear on ƚŚĞďĞůŝĞĨ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŶĞƐƐ PĂůůƚŚŽƐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝƐ
misleading.
11
  A person who forms a belief on the basis of misleading evidence may 
well be rational even if her belief is false. dŚĂƚǇŽƵƌĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ƐƉŚŽŶĞnumber appears 
ŽŶǇŽƵƌƉŚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ display is a reason to believe that he is calling you and you are 
rational in forming the belief, even if in fact his phone has been stolen, and the caller 
is the thief. Thus (2) and (3) pull in different directions. In addition, it is not clear 
ǁŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŶĞƐƐ ?ĐŽŵĞƐƚŽǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞůŝĞĨ ? There is no 
standard of correctness comparable to truth with regard to intentions.
12
 Hence this 
ŝƐŶ ?ƚĂĨĞĂƚƵƌĞǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƐŚĂƌĞĚďǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶt kinds of attitudes. 
(4), as far as I can make out, ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĂĚĚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?dŚŝƐůĞĂǀĞƐƵƐǁŝƚŚ ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?. 
 ? ? ?ŝƐ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ ?ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐůǇƉƵƚ ?/ƚŵĂǇďĞǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂǇ ?ŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞƐƚ
friend committed a heinous crime, but the evidence that she did is not therefore of 
the wrong kind. Whether or not it is difficult to form the attitude is irrelevant. I 
suspect that (1) is inspired by a different kind of concern anyway: by the observation 
that we can follow only certain kinds of reasons directly when we form a belief (or 
reason towards a belief). We should then replace (1) with the stricter (1*): we 
cannot reason to the belief that p via a certain kind of reason for believing that p.
13
  
                                                      
10
 Schroeder (2012), 458ff. 
11
 The referees urged me to clarify: ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞďĞĂƌŽŶĂďĞůŝĞĨ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞƐŽŵĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞďĞůŝĞĨ ?ƐƚƌƵƚŚĨŽƌŝƚƚŽďĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƚĂůů ?/ ?ŵŶŽƚ
sure of this. My evidence can be misleading in the sense that if I had reasoned correctly (if I had been 
aware of defeaters, for instance), I would not have formed the false belief. It can also be misleading in 
the sense that even if I reason correctly, I end up with a false belief. The connection with truth in the 
second case is moot ?ƵƚďĞƚŚĂƚĂƐŝƚŵĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ďĞĂƌŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ/ ?ŵĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚ
following misleading evidence does not contribute to forming a true belief. 
12
 Schroeder admits as much, and reserves (3) for beliefs only. If so, it will not help with finding a 
unified account of wrong kind reasons for attitudes in general anyway. For a diverging view, 
attempting to formulate a standard of correctness for intentions, see Shah (2008) and McHugh (2012). 
13
 ^ĐŚƌŽĞĚĞƌŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐƉƵƚĂƚŝǀĞt<ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ-ŐŝǀĞŶ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?^ŝŶĐĞ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚĨŝŶĚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ
of state- and object-given reasons helpful, I will stick for the time being with the more concrete 
example of wishful thinking-type reasons. I will come back to the question whether we can identify 
the relevant kind of reasons in a more general way. 
 6 
In addition, we may want to accept (2): purported wrong kind reasons do not 
contribute to the rationality of forming the attitude. This is the feature I relied on 
when I described reasons in wishful thinking cases as putatively of the wrong kind.
14
 
If (1*) and (2) identify wrong kind reasons, the FA theorist might be able to utilize 
those earmarks to solve her WKR problem: to give a non-circular account of the 
counterexamples to the view. The suggestion would be that a putative reason is of 
the wrong kind if and only if we cannot reason from it to the attitude for which it is a 
reason, and responding to the reason would not contribute to the rationality of the 
attitude in question (or: not responding to it does not prove the person irrational, 
even if she is aware of the reason, and believes that it is conclusive). If so this could 
be our candidate explanation of the wrong/right kind of reasons distinction, cutting 
across FA theory, and Reasons Theory. 
Let us test this suggestion by considering how it might be applied in FA theory. There 
is relative agreement that evidence for the truth of a proposition, p, is a reason to 
believe that p. One kind of evidence is testimony. Testimony and other kinds of 
evidence are reasons of the right kind for forming beliefs, if anything is. I can 
rationally form the belief that it is now ŽŶĞŽ ?ĐůŽĐŬ on the basis of your testimony. 
Compare now reasons to believe with reasons for different kinds of attitudes, the 
ones that FA theory is in fact concerned with ? ‘dmiration ? is one of those. Reasons 
to admire someone or something may be evidence- or testimony-based. Perhaps I 
admire a medical researcher because a friend who (unlike me) understands medical 
research has assured me ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬis brilliant. Or I admire Einstein 
because his work is deemed by everyone in the profession as ground-breaking and 
setting the agenda for modern physics. It seems that my admiration would be 
appropriate in these cases. But the reason for it  W that my friend told me, or that 
physicists agree that the researcher, or Einstein, is brilliant  W is not one of the 
features that make it the case that she or he is. Their brilliance does not consist 
(even in part) in my friĞŶĚ ?Ɛ ŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƉĞĞƌƐ ? testimony.  
For the FA theorist, evidence-based reasons are of the wrong kind for admiration 
(assuming that testimony is a kind of evidence). It is a counterexample to the basic 
FA-formula:  “dŚĞ researcher, A, is admirable if and only if A has other properties that 
ŵĂŬĞĂĚŵŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚĞƌĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? ?Whatever properties the medical 
researcher may have that make her admirable, my friend ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŝƐŶŽƚĂŵŽŶŐ
                                                      
14
 Making the connection with rationality requires understanding evidence as subjective evidence: 
considerations that a person takes to be evidence. It is, at any rate not clear, whether disregarding 
evidence for p that a person does not regard as evidence for p proves a rational failure.  ‘ZŝŐŚƚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?
would then be all those reasons that make an attitude rational, even if they include misleading 
evidence, or are shaped by a failure to take in relevant information ?ĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚŝƐŝƐŶ ?ƚĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨ
rationality. ,ŝĞƌŽŶǇŵŝ ?ƐĂƐƚƌŽůŽŐǇĞǆĂŵƉůĞ is an ambiguous one here: as she sees it, a person who 
believes that the stars influence our destiny, and reads in her daily horoscope that she will have a 
wonderful day today, might believe this for a right kind reason. Right kind reasons, Hieronymi (2005) 
urges, ĂƌĞŶŽƚ ‘ŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ? ?On the current approach, believing that the stars influence our destiny 
must either be a belief that one could rationally hold, or her understanding of right reasons does not 
endorse the two earmarks (but perhaps only 1*). However, her general conclusion that right reasons 
ŶĞĞĚŶ ?ƚďĞŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŚŽůĚƐĞŝƚŚĞƌǁĂǇ ? 
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them. But even though the testimony-based reason is of the wrong kind, it is not a 
reason that we cannot follow or reason from ?ŽƌĂƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽ
the rationality of the attitude. 
There are evidence-based reasons for other pro-attitudes as well: I may desire a new 
computer because it received good reviews. For FA theory this is a wrong kind 
reason to desire the computer: the value of the computer does not consist in its 
getting good reviews. (If anything, it gets good reviews because it is a good 
computer  W not the other way around.) 
In addition, there are evidence-based wrong kind reasons which do not involve 
testimony: imagine a patient exhibiting changes in skin colour that are characteristic 
of liver disease. His doctor relies on this evidence in issuing a prescription for 
medication perhaps because she works under conditions where it is not possible to 
investigate the state of the liver itself more thoroughly. (There is no negligence 
involved.) According to the Reasons Theorist she responds to right kind reasons in 
forming the belief that the treatment ŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ PƚŚĞǇĞůůŽǁŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐŬŝŶŝƐ ?ůĞƚ ?Ɛ
assume, sufficient evidence of liver disease. How about FA theory though? The 
ĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ willingness to help by prescribing the medication seems an appropriate 
attitude: the observed change in skin colour is a reason for the attitude that the 
doctor can reason from; her attitude is rational. However, according to FA theory, 
the right kind reasons for the attitude (willingness to help) are those provided by the 
ďĂĚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƵƚƚŚĞƐŬŝŶĐŽůŽƵƌŝƐŶ ?ƚďĂĚĨŽƌ ƚŚĞpatient, and 
therefore not a right kind reason to want to treat him  W it is only correlated with 
something that is: with the liver disease.  
Evidence-based reasons, it seems, are throughout of the wrong kind for FA theory. 
But they are otherwise of the right kind.  Hence FA theorists and Reasons Theorists 
track a different distinction when they use the right/wrong kind of reason 
terminology. 
Let me briefly consider two objections to this argument: 
First objection: DǇĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?Ɛ testimony is not a reason to admire the researcher, you 
may object, but just a reason to believe that there is a reason to admire her. 
Therefore, evidence-based reasons are not reasons that the FA theorist is concerned 
ǁŝƚŚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƐŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽgive an account of the 
fittingness of beliefs).  
Reply: It is not clear to me why the testimony would not provide a reason for 
admiration, and not just for beliefs about reasons for admiration. Presumably, the 
objection simply takes for granted that evidence and testimony bear only on belief.
15
 
/ĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐƐŽ ?ƵƚůĞƚ ?ƐŐƌĂŶƚƚŚĞŵŽǀĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŬĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?Even so, 
it would not show that the argument does not go through: if I have a reason to 
believe that there is a reason to admire X, it would be (other things being equal
16
) 
                                                      
15
 Attitudes like admiration seem to incorporate beliefs about the admirability of their object. So 
insofar as reasons for admiration are reasons for the incorporated belief, they should be evidence-
based, just as the standard reasons for belief generally are. 
16
 Things are not equal if the reason is defeated, say. 
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rational for me to admire X. It would therefore be fitting to admire X because of the 
testimony. I could also reason from my belief that there is a reason to admire X to 
forming the attitude, admiration (to the degree that admiration can be the outcome 
of reasoning at all
17
). This should suffice to show that the reason is not of the wrong 
kind, except for FA theory where it is a counterexample to the analysis. In my final 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝƐĞǀĞŶĐůĞĂƌĞƌ PƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƐŬŝŶĐŽůŽƵƌŝƐŚĂƌĚůǇũƵƐƚĂƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽ
believe that willingness to help would be an appropriate attitude. It is a reason for 
the attitude itself. But it is, for FA theory, a wrong kind reason. 
Second objection: The reason to admire is not that my friend tells me, but that to 
which she testifies: the brilliance of the research.
18
 In the examples, my epistemic 
access to the relevant feature is via testimony. ŶĚƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌ
being willing to help is heƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŝůůŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚŚŝƐ skin colour which is only 
indicative of the illness. 
Reply: This is, I think, wrong: evidence can be misleading without therefore failing to 
be evidence ?dŚƵƐǁŚŝůĞŵǇĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?Ɛ testimony is evidence for the brilliance of the 
research, the research may in fact not be brilliant (perhaps unbeknownst to my 
friend, it was plagiarized) ?/ŶƚŚĂƚĐĂƐĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ have a 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽĂĚŵŝƌĞƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŵǇĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ?ƵƚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐ, 
intuitively, that I do have such a reason. At the very least, I have a reason to believe 
that there is a reason to admire the research. So it would be rational for me to 
admire it  W ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐǁĞ ?ƌĞďĂĐŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŚŽǁƐ
even more clearly that evidence is defeasible: the case may be unusual in that the 
change in skin colour is caused by something other than a liver disease. But that 
does nothing to undermine that the doctor responds to a right kind reason when she 
is willing to help because of the change in skin colour, according to the Reasons 
Theorist, and to a wrong kind reason, according to the FA theorist. 
I take it then that the argument is sound: the distinction between right and wrong 
kind reasons is not the same in FA theory and in Reasons Theory.
19
 Many ordinary 
reasons that make forming an attitude appropriate are wrong kind reasons from the 
perspective of FA theory. But then the aim of FA theory is to provide an account (or 
an analysis) of value  W not of the appropriateness of attitudes. So even if most 
reasons which justify pro-attitudes and make them appropriate were reasons of the 
                                                      
17
 If this is doubtful, it is not because in this case I argue from my belief that there is a reason to 
admire to admiring it, but rather because admiration, being an emotion, may not be typically the 
result of reasoning. Assuming that it is nonetheless what Scanlon (1998) has ĐĂůůĞĚĂ ‘ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ-
ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĂŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞƚŽũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝƚ ?ƚŚĞ 
relevant sensitivity may not typically be realized by generating the attitude in a process of deliberate 
reasoning. 
18
 / ?ŵŐƌĂƚĞĨƵů to Mark Schroeder for this suggestion. 
19
 There are other examples that might show this. Wlodek Rabinowicz has added three other kinds in 
an unpublished paper. To mention but one: in fn 8 I remarked that there is a WK/RK reasons 
distinction regarding reasons to act in FA theory, but it does not have a counterpart in Reasons 
Theory. In this case too, WK reasons in FA theory do not bear ƚŚĞƚǁŽ ‘ĞĂƌŵĂƌŬƐ ?. They are simply 
reasons to, say, protect an object which are not providĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂůǀĂůƵĞ ?.g. an evil 
demon threatens me unless I protect something worthless. There is no problem with reasoning from 
those reasons, nor would be irrational to follow them. 
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wrong kind, the FA theoriƐƚŶĞĞĚŶ ?ƚǁŽƌƌǇ ?dhat ordinary (demon-free) reasons turn 
out to be of the wrong kind is not a problem for FA theory. But what this does show 
is that the Reason Theorist and the FA theorist must be talking about a different 
distinction, since right kind reasons for Reasons Theory turn out to be wrong kind 
reasons for FA theory. It also shows that FA theory cannot resort to (1*) and (2) in 
order to draw the distinction between the right and the wrong kind of reasons. At 
least some counterexamples to FA theory  W i.e. wrong kind reasons within FA theory 
 W will be right kind reasons according to those earmarks. 
But even if FA theory and Reasons Theory are concerned with different distinctions, 
there is, at least with regard to beliefs, a relatively clear distinction between 
evidence-based reasons, and (e.g.) wishful thinking-type reasons.  
Our preliminary result is that there are certain reasons for believing p where we 
cannot reason from those considerations to believing that p, and ŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞ
rational to form a belief that p for those reasons, nor a failure of rationality not to 
respond to them. No doubt, this, if true, shows us something about the nature of 
belief, for which an account of belief must offer an explanation. But it will not be the 
same explanation that helps us to distinguish right and wrong kind reasons in FA 
theory.
20
 
This then concludes the argument for my first claim: the right /wrong kind of reasons 
distinction in FA theory is different from the distinction which comes under the same 
name in Reasons Theory. 
ƵƚƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂt<ZƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ĂƐŝƚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ in 
Reason Theory (leaving FA theory behind from now on): a problem that arises for all 
kinds of reason-sensitive attitudes pointing towards a unified account of theoretical 
and practical reasons and normativity. I will therefore now pursue the question 
whether the distinction generalizes: whether there is a similar distinction between 
reasons for attitudes other than belief  W in particular whether there is a similar 
distinction with regard to reasons to intend.  
3. Reasons to intend and the alleged WKR problem 
In the case of belief, I compared truth-related reasons, and reasons that are 
provided by the value of the attitude of believing. But with intentions, all putative 
reasons depend on value
21
. Even so, we can distinguish between reasons that are 
provided by the value of the intended action, and those that are provided by the 
value of having the attitude (the value of intending). Would this lead to a parallel 
distinction, a distinction between the right and wrong kinds of reasons to intend? 
First of all, it is remarkably difficult to find a parallel to wishful-thinking-type reasons 
for belief  W reasons that are grounded only in the value of having the belief  W with 
                                                      
20
 A lot more needs to be said about the relation of reasons for belief and rationality here. Assuming 
that all right kind reasons to believe are evidence-based, is forming a belief rational only if it is based 
on the available evidence? If not, then the two purported earmarks may apply to different kinds of 
considerations. 
21
 Or at least, more broadly, on normative considerations. 
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regard to intentions. Imagine that it really matters to me that you should intend to 
come to my party, but ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌĂƐ much whether you actually show up; or 
an evil demon threatens to torture me unless I intend to swallow the contents of a 
saucer full of mud, but he doĞƐŶ ?ƚĐĂƌĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ or not I swallow it. In both cases, we 
have reasons to form an intention. We should expect that they are of the wrong kind, 
since the reason derives from the value of having the intention, rather than the 
value of acting as intended.  
But in these cases, the reasons to intend generate instrumental reasons to act as 
intended: you could simply come to my party, thereby setting my worries to rest, or I 
could swallow the mud, proving my intention to do so. If we did these things, we 
would have done them intentionally. The reason for acting as intended would be 
that there is value in having the intention, and by intentionally acting as we have 
reason to intend, we have that intention. There is no problem with acquiring the 
intentions for those reasons, nor would doing so be irrational.
22
 
Thus, the fact that there is no independent reason (independent of the value of 
having the intention) ƚŽĂĐƚĂƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽŝŶƚĞŶĚƚŚĞ
wrong kind. By contrast, when there is no independent reason to believe (no reason 
that is independent of the value of having the belief) the reason to believe would be 
of the wrong kind. The disanalogy here is not that we can, by acting in a certain way, 
acquire the intention, whereas we cannot, by acting in a certain way, acquire the 
belief. We can do the latter too.
23
 The disanalogy is that in the case of intentions 
there is no irrationality in acquiring the intention in this way, whereas in the case of 
belief there would be.  
There is a second important lesson here: the examples above do not seem to be of 
wrong kind reasons. But the first earmark of WK reasons does nonetheless hold of 
them: we cannot follow the reason to intend directly. I take it that one follows a 
reason for an attitude directly if and only if one forms the attitude in response to the 
reason without taking further steps towards acquiring it. In all those case where we 
need to take action to acquire an attitude, we do not follow the reason directly. The 
cases above are of this kind: you follow the reason to intend to come to the party by 
coming, and I follow the reason to intend to swallow the mud by swallowing it. 
These are right kind reasons, because they pass according to the second earmark: 
following the reason (by acting) is rational. But whether or not we count them as RK 
or WK reasons, the examples show that, in the case of intentions (as opposed to 
beliefs) the two earmarks pƵůůĂƉĂƌƚ ?ĂŶĚĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĞůƉƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂ ‘ŬŝŶĚ ? ? 
dŚĞŽŶůǇŬŝŶĚŽĨĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐƚŚĂƚĞǆŚŝďŝƚƚŚĞƚǁŽ “ĞĂƌŵĂƌŬƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞ
neighbourhood of the toxin puzzle.
24
 It seems true that an agent cannot directly 
                                                      
22
 For similar observations see Hieronymi (2005), as well as Raz (2009). 
23
 We can follow indirect strategies for acquiring beliefs, e.g. expose ourselves only to arguments in 
their favour, or see a hypnotist. 
24
 The toxin puzzle (Kavka 1983): an eccentric billionaire would transfer a million pounds into your 
bank account at midnight today, if you now intend to drink a (mild) toxin tomorrow. The toxin will 
not kill you, but it will cause you some discomfort. The billionaire does not require that you drink 
the toxin, but only that you form the intention to do so. You know now that tomorrow there 
will be no reason for you to drink the toxin, since either the money is already in your bank account 
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form an intention to drink the toxin, for the reason that it would get her the money, 
and if she failed to respond to the reason  W that is, if she does not form the intention 
 W the failure does not prove her irrational, even when the reason for having the 
intention is conclusive and undefeated. 
The distinctive feature of this kind of case is that there is (as the agent knows) no 
reason for acting as intended  W not even an instrumental one, as in the examples I 
mentioned before (i.e. there is no reason to intentionally act as intended as a means 
to acquiring the intention because in toxin puzzle cases we need to form the 
intention prior to, and therefore independently of, the intended action). 
This may suggest that we cannot rationally form intentions unless we believe that 
there is some reason for the intended action, instrumental or otherwise. In the party 
case, you have an instrumental reason for coming to my party, as it proves your 
intention to do so. So the wrong kind of reasons to intend would be those where 
there is (or: the agent believes there is) no reason to act as intended, but only a 
reason for having the intention. This is rarely the case, because we often can comply 
with reasons to intend (which are provided by the value of having the intention) by 
intentionally acting in a certain way. Thus the reason to intend often generates an 
instrumental reason to act.  
If reasons of the toxin puzzle variety are WK reasons to intend, and the ones in the 
earlier examples are RK reasons, is there any way of saying why which does not draw 
on the earmarks (whicŚ ?ĂƐǁĞŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶ ?ǁŽŶ ?ƚŚĞůƉ ? ? With regard to beliefs we 
explored the substantive view that evidence for p is a right kind of reason to believe 
that p. In parallel, we may want to say: 
[RKI]  A reason, R, to ĳ is a right kind reason to intend to ĳ. 
RKI is a widely accepted claim  W tacitly or expressly.25 The dispute about reasons to 
intend concerns for the most part the question whether or not there are other 
reaƐŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚŬŝŶĚ ? ?ŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚZ</ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐ. So the parallel to 
the belief-account of the right/wrong kind of reasons distinction could go like this:  
1. RKI covers all the right kind reasons to intend. Call this the exclusivity claim 
 ?ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐŽŶŽƌDĐ,ƵŐŚ ?ƐĂƉƚƚĞƌŵ26). 
2. Other putative reasons to intend are of the wrong kind. 
3. The explanation of RKI and the exclusivity claim will take roughly the same 
form as the explanation of the right/wrong kind of reasons distinction 
regarding belief, thereby showing that practical normativity can be traced 
back to the nature of intentions in the same way in which epistemic 
normativity is grounded in the nature of belief. 
                                                                                                                                                        
or you won ?t receive it. Thus you have a reason to form the intention to drink the toxin, but no 
reason to actually drink it. 
25
 Cf. Shah (2008), Schroeder (2012), McHugh (2012), Pink (1991).  
26
 McHugh (2013) 
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However, not only is there no explanation for the truth of RKI that parallels the 
explanation of why evidence, or truth-related considerations more broadly, are 
reasons to believe, but RKI is simply false ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇǁĞŶĞĞĚŶ ?t worry about 
exclusivity  W or so I will argue now. 
3.1. Against RKI 
Let me begin by distinguishing between basic and further intentions regarding 
intentions in action, and then consider whether RKI identifies right kind reasons (or 
indeed any reasons) for forming intentions of either kind. 
Basic intention: ĳ-ing with the intention to ĳ. E.g. I am writing to Paolo with the 
intention of ĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ ?,ĞƌĞ ‘ĳ-ing with the intention to ĳ ? contrasts with ĳ-ing 
mistakenly, or unintentionally, as when I mistakenly send the email which I had 
intended to send to Paolo to Pat instead. 
Further intention: ĳ-ing with the intention of bringing about some result, O, when O 
is different from ĳ-ing. The ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽ ? ?ŝƐ
concerned with further intentions, e.g.: I ?ŵǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ to Paolo with the intention of 
inviting him to my party. 
Typically, when a person acts with a further intention, she has a basic intention too: 
when I write to Paolo with the intention of inviting him, I also intend to write to him. 
And the other way around: when a person acts with a basic intention she often has a 
furtheƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ PǁŚĞŶ/ǁƌŝƚĞƚŽWĂŽůŽ ?/ĚŽŶ ?t just intend to write to him, but I 
intend something else: to invite him, or to tell him something. But not all basic 
intentions are accompanied by further intentions: I may hum a tune intentionally, 
but with no further intention, not even an intention to get it right.
27 28
 
 
With this distinction in place are right kind reasons to intend reasons to form a basic 
intention, or a further intention? According to our formulation of RKI, they are 
presumably reasons for having a basic intention. The reason to ĳ is, RKI tells us, a 
reason to intend to ĳ, not a reason to ĳ with the intention of bringing about O, or a 
reason to have the intention to bring about O by ĳ-ing.  
Now take the example of Julie: 
Julie is a talented young author, writing her first novel. There are many reasons for 
her to do so: that writing the novel ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐ:ƵůŝĞ ?ƐƚĂůĞŶƚƐ ?that it will put her on the 
map as a writer, thereby starting her professional career, that she enjoys writing, or 
that she is going to tell an important story in a new, and thought-provoking way. 
                                                      
27
 Note that in these cases the agent has two intentions: a basic intention and a further one. The claim 
is not that the basic intention is a further one (or the other way around). 
28
 There may be further distinctions to be drawn regarding intentions, in particular between 
intentions in action, and future-directed intentions. Above I explained the distinction between basic 
and further intentions with regard to intentions in action. But the distinction can be applied mutatis 
mutandis to future-directed intentions as well: I may intend to go for a walk later with the basic 
intention of going for a walk; or I may intend to go out later to post a letter (further intention). 
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Might these be reasons to form further intentions Pŝ ?Ğ ?ŵŝŐŚƚ:ƵůŝĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŚĂƚďǇ
writing a novel she would put herself on the map as a writer be a reason for her to 
write a novel with the intention of putting herself on the map? They had better not 
be, for two reasons: first, this way of applying RKI leads to mistakes, as is obvious 
with the reasons to write because Julie enjoys doing it, or because doing so furthers 
her talents. These are cases in which having the intention to write in order to enjoy 
herself, or further her talents, is likely to undermine the result. Secondly, if Julie fails 
to have an intention to put herself on the map, or to start her professional career, 
but writes because she is fascinated by the topic she has fastened on, there would 
ďĞŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂŵŝƐƐǁŝƚŚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚ:ƵůŝĞ ?Ɛmust have a plethora 
of intentions which reflect the contents of her reasons for acting. 
Thus RKI presumably applies in the following way: ŽŶĞŽĨ:ƵůŝĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝƐ
that she would enjoy doing so (=R). That she enjoys writing is a reason to write, and 
therefore  W applying RKI  W a reason to intend to write. And similarly for all the other 
reasons: they are all reasons for her to intend to write, but not reasons to form any 
particular further intention in doing so. The content of the intention she has reason 
to have does not mirror the content of her reasons for writing.  
So as we presumed, RKI requires only a basic intention. And intuitively, this seems 
right: the reason to intend that Julie does have is a reason to intend to write a novel 
 W and this is surely not a reason of the wrong kind.  
But getting to this result depends on specifying the reason and the action in the right 
ǁĂǇ PǁĞĐŽƵůĚƚŚŝŶŬŽĨ ‘ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐŽŶĞƐĞůĨŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƉ ? as an action, the reason for 
doing so being that it is a useful thing to do. In that case, that putting oneself on the 
map is useful would provide a reason for intending to put oneself on the map. Or the 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶŵĂǇďĞ ‘ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐƚĂůĞŶƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚthe reason for it that doing so is 
generally a ŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞŶZ</ŐĞƚƐƵƐ PƚŚĂƚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐƚĂůĞŶƚƐŝƐ a good thing 
is a reason to intend to ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐƚĂůĞŶƚƐ. Thus ǁĞ ?ůůŐĞƚĂƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽ
ŝŶƚĞŶĚĂĨƚĞƌĂůů ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶŚŽǁǁĞƐƉĞĐŝĨǇ:ƵůŝĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽĂĐƚ ?29 It begins to 
seem less clear that Julie has all those reasons to intend, even granting that those 
are reasons for her to act. This is even more obvioƵƐŝĨǁĞƌĞŐĂƌĚ ‘enjoying herƐĞůĨ ?
as an activity, and the reason for doing so that enjoying herself is good for Julie. 
Specified thus ?Z</ǁŽƵůĚƚĞůůƵƐƚŚĂƚ:ƵůŝĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽĞŶũŽǇŚĞƌƐĞůĨ(R = enjoyment is 
good for her) is a reason for her to intend to enjoy herself. That seems plainly false 
since forming such an intention is likely to undermine the result. Thus while we can 
tweak the descriptions of the relevant reasons and actions in such a way that they 
get us the right result  W that Julie has a reason to intend to write a novel  W it is not 
clear why we have to do the tweaking. Why can we not apply RKI to whatever the 
reason, and the action (or the activity)? 
What we are trying engineer is this: Julie has precisely one reason to form an 
intention, nameůǇĂƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽŝŶƚĞŶĚƚŽǁƌŝƚĞĂŶŽǀĞů ?^ŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽ
                                                      
29
 Those different specifications are not in tension, or in competition. Quite commonly, if R is a reason 
to ĳ, there will be some consideration, Q, which is a reason to bring about R, e.g. if a reason for 
breaking eggs is that doing so is necessary for baking a cake, there is some other consideration, e.g. 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐĂŬĞǁŝůůďĞƚĂƐƚǇ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚ/ ?ŵŚƵŶŐƌǇ ?ĨŽƌďĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂŬĞ ? 
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ĚŽƐŽǁŝƚŚĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƐŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?t have reasons to intend 
to engage in any other kinds of action or activity that would lead to complying with 
her reasons. What explains this? 
Here is my hypothesis: a reason to ĳ provides a reason to intend to ĳ only if there is 
a reason to ĳ intentionally. There presumably is no reason to intentionally further 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐƚĂůĞŶƚƐ ?ŽƌƚŽŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƉƵƚŽŶĞƐĞůĨŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƉŽƌĞŶũŽǇŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ?But there 
is a reason to intentionally write a novel, if one has a reason to write one in the first 
place. This difference calls for an explanation. 
Writing a novel is an activity that determines the pursuit of many other goals by 
putting them in their place, or banishing them from the productive working hours. It 
also requires actions other than writing such as doing research on the subject matter, 
and so on. It is hard to imagine that one could succeed in writing a novel without 
ŝŶƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŽǁƌŝƚĞŽŶĞĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ? Thus having an intention 
to write is useful (perhaps even indispensable) for succeeding with the activity. This 
ŝƐŶ ?ƚƚƌƵĞ of all actions but at least of those which are as complex as writing a novel, 
ĂŶĚĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞĚŽŶĞƐĞŵŝ-automatically. This kind of reason for having an intention 
ŝƐŶ ?ƚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇZ</ ?
And there is a further reason to reject RKI. If :ƵůŝĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŽǁƌŝƚĞĂ
short-story which, as it happened, evolved into a novel there would not have been 
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĂŵŝƐƐǁŝƚŚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?^ŚĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶ
this case. Perhaps intending to write a novel would have been daunting for her, and 
led her to abandon the project whereas the intention to write a short-story provided 
the right kind of structure and guidance to get into the project of writing a novel 
which is, ůĞƚ ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵĞ ?ǁŚĂƚƐŚĞŚĂƐŵŽƐƚƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽĚŽ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƌƚĂůĞŶƚůŝĞƐ ? ?
Thus her reason to write a novel would have given her a reason to intend to write a 
short story. RKI cannot explain this.  
What explains her reasons for having the intention is the instrumental value of 
having it: having the intention is useful, perhaps even necessary, in order to do 
something worthwhile like writing a novel. Call this the facilitative reason to intend.
30
 
It is a textbook case of a reason of the wrong kind (for those who accept RKI), since it 
is the value of having the intention, the psychological benefit of having it, which 
provides a reason for it. However, it seems to me that the facilitative reason is the 
most common reason for forming intentions. Reasons for having a basic intention 
are, broadly speaking, instrumental: there are such reasons if and because having 
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚŽŶĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ? 
In addition to having a reason for writing, Julie may have a reason to have a further 
intention. As we have seen above there are many reasons for acting in a certain way. 
No doubt, when someone embarks on an enterprise as complex and extended as 
writing a novel, she is very likely to have a further intention  W but it may change over 
time. Let ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚat the outset Julie has the further intention of developing the 
psychology of her main character. The further intention reveals why Julie begins 
                                                      
30
 Pink (1991) also argues for the facilitative role of intentions in slightly different way. 
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writing the novel in the first place: which of the reasons she had for writing it were 
most salient to her. But her writing for this reason is compatible with complying with 
the other reasons for writing that she also has, even if she has no particular intention 
to do so. She would comply with them because (and as long as) they are not reasons 
to act with a particular intention. She will simply end up developing her talents, 
starting her professional career, putting herself on the map and enjoying herself. 
Thus while there is a reason for which a person chooses to undertake a certain 
pursuit which is reflected in her further intentions, there is no need to mirror all of 
her reasons to act, or even any particular one, in this way. 
There are, however, reasons other than the facilitative reason to do something 
intentionally: some actions have value only if they are done with (or without) a 
particular intention. dĂŬĞ ‘ƚŚĂŶŬŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ĂƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƌĞĂƐŽŶ
for thanking a person, this is ipso facto a reason for thanking her intentionally. An 
action that is not done with the intention of thanking another may not even count as 
ƚŚĂŶŬŝŶŐŚĞƌ ?ƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚŝƚĚŽĞƐ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞǀĂůƵĞĂƐĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ
gratitude. There is value in this action only when it is done with the right intention. A 
reason for an action of this kind would therefore always be a reason to have (or in 
different cases: lack) the relevant basic intention. But it is not in general true that the 
value of an action depends on its being done with a particular intention. 
Furthermore, even in these cases, the reason to intend does not derive from the 
reason to act in the way RKI has it. The reason to act is, from the start, a reason-to-
act-with-intention-I. There is no further (derivative) reason to intend to act with 
intention I. Thus, in those cases the reason to intend is not explained by RKI. 
What explains our reasons to intend is not RKI. We have a reason to form an 
intention when we have a reason to do something intentionally. Sometimes, 
complying with a reasons requires acting intentionally, because the intention (some 
intention, at any rate) is needed for successfully completing the action (the 
facilitative reason), or because the value of the action depends on the intention with 
which it is done.  
This then is my case for the second claim: the claim that there is no WKR problem 
which takes the same form for reason to intend and reasons to believe.
31
 There is no 
unifying explanation of a shared phenomenon (the W/RK distinction) that could lead 
to a unified account of theoretical and practical normativity, since there is no such 
phenomenon. Not only is it false that reasons to ĳ are RK reasons to intend to ĳ  W 
they are, all by themselves, no reasons for forming any intention. The most common 
reason to intend  W the facilitative reason  W is explained by the value of intending, and 
therefore seemingly of the wrong kind.  
3.2. Toxin 
There remains one loose end which I would like to tie up:  the Toxin puzzle illustrates 
that we cannot, or cannot rationally, intend to ĳ, unless there is (as we see it) a 
reason to ĳ. It is perhaps this observation that lends RKI whatever initial plausibility 
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 &ŽƌĂŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐĞĞŵǇ ‘ZĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽ/ŶƚĞŶĚ ? ?ĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐ ? ? 
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it seems to have. So if we reject RKI, why then is it that we ĐĂŶ ?ƚfollow the reason to 
intend in the Toxin Puzzle? After all, having the intention would be very useful in this 
case too ?/ƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞƌĞĂĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐŝƚƚŚĞŶ ? 
If a person were to form an intention to drink the toxin, she would (if she is rational 
and reflective) do so, knowing that she will not act on it. There is a long-standing 
discussion
32
 whether having an intention involves a belief, or even more strongly: 
certainty, that one will act as intended. If it did, solving the toxin puzzle would be 
easy: a rational agent would know that she is not going to act as intended, since she 
would know that, at the time of action, there will be no reason for her to do so. 
Hence she cannot form the intention. However, the assumption that having an 
intention involves a belief, or a certainty, of this kind is doubtful. We are able to 
form intentions when we are not sure whether or not we will act as intended. New 
zĞĂƌ ?ƐƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŵĂǇďĞĂĐĂƐĞŝŶƉŽŝŶt: there would be no need to even form such 
a resolution if we already believed, or were certain, that we will act as we resolve to 
do. But a sincere resolution of this kind involves an intention to act on it.
33
 
Yet even if forming an intention does not require the belief that one will act as 
intended, it may require the absence of the belief that one will not do so. This, I 
think, explains the Toxin puzzle: you cannot form the intention to drink the toxin, 
because you know ahead of time that you will not drink it (again: assuming that you 
are reflective and rational). Thus an agent can  W reflectively and rationally  W form an 
intention to ĳ only if she does not believe that she will not ĳ. This, if true, calls for a 
further explanation, and it certainly does show us something about the nature of 
intentions. I will not pursue the issue here, but it seems clear at the outset that the 
explanation will have little to do with the explanation of the distinction of WK/RK 
reasons to believe, since there is no commonality in the explanandum. 
The facilitative reason to form an intention is, by contrast, a reason to form an 
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŚĞůƉƐƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚŽŶĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽĂĐƚ. Thus, when 
there is a facilitative reason there is always, necessarily, a reason to act as intended 
as well. This contrast explains why the facilitative reason is a standard case of a 
reason to intend, rather than a WK reasons, despite the fact that it is provided by the 
value of having the intention.  
 
Conclusions 
First, the right/wrong kind of reasons distinction in FA theory is independent and 
different from its alleged uses elsewhere.  
Secondly, beyond FA theory, there is a distinction with regard to reasons for belief: 
between evidence for the truth of p (or more broadly: truth-related reasons for 
                                                      
32
 E.g. Grice (1972), Harman (1976), and, more recently, Setiya (2012) all argue for different versions 
of this view. 
33
 Resolving is different from intending, and perhaps having resolved to ĳ strengthens the likelihood 
that you will ĳ. If so there may be a stronger reason to believe that you will ĳ because you have 
resolved to do so. But even so, there is nothing like certainty here. 
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believing p), and reasons to believe p because having the belief would be good in 
some respect, independently of whether or not p is true. Reasons of the latter kind 
exhibit two earmarks: we cannot follow them directly (we cannot reason from them 
to believing p), and failing to comply with them is not a failure of rationality. While 
there is a striking contrast between these kinds of reasons to believe, there is no 
similar distinction regarding reasons to intend. There are two ways of drawing the 
distinction: (1) by appealing to the two earmarks; or (2) by giving a substantive 
account: only evidence-based reasons are right kind reasons for belief. They 
converge on the same distinction. With regard to reasons to intend, neither one 
works. Regarding the first, some right kind reasons bear the first earmark of wrong 
kind reasons: that we cannot follow them directly. The two earmarks pull apart. With 
regard to the substantive account, I considered the generally accepted view that 
reasons to act provide right kind reasons to intend (similar to the role of evidence in 
the epistemic case). It turned out that in many cases ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽĂĐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
any reasons to intend, and that the most common reason to intend, the facilitative 
reason, is provide by the benefit of having an intention, not by the reason to act. The 
hypothesis I defended is that, if there is a sufficient reason for doing something 
intentionally, then there is a reason to form an intention.  
Thus there is nothing on the RK side of the alleged distinction that resembles RK 
reasons to believe, and there is nothing on the WK side either. What makes Toxin 
puzzle reasons  ‘ǁƌŽŶŐ ?(this was the only remote relative of WK reason I could make 
out on the intention side, going by the two earmarks as their distinguishing feature) 
is very different from whatever explains the distinction with regard to reasons to 
believe.  
The remaining truth is that in order to understand reasons for having particular kinds 
of attitudes, we have to understand the nature of those attitudes. But there is no 
distinction between the right/ wrong kind of reasons that bears a rough similarity 
across attitudes, and could contribute to understanding the rationality of those 
attitudes along similar lines. It therefore seems to me that we would do well to 
abandon the talk of the right and wrong kind of reasons outside of FA theory 
altogether!
34
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